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Abstract 
In recent years, there has been a heated debate about how to interpret findings that seem to show 
that humans rapidly and automatically calculate the visual perspectives of others. In the current 
study, we investigated the question of whether automatic interference effects found in the dot-
perspective task (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010) are the product 
of domain-specific perspective-taking processes or of domain-general “submentalizing” processes 
(Heyes, 2014). Previous attempts to address this question have done so by implementing inanimate 
controls, such as arrows, as stimuli. The rationale for this is that submentalizing processes that 
respond to directionality should be engaged by such stimuli, whereas domain-specific perspective-
taking mechanisms, if they exist, should not. These previous attempts have been limited, however, 
by the implied intentionality of the stimuli they have used (e.g. arrows), which may have invited 
participants to imbue them with perspectival agency. Drawing inspiration from “novel entity” 
paradigms from infant gaze-following research, we designed a version of the dot-perspective task 
that allowed us to precisely control whether a central stimulus was viewed as animate or inanimate. 
Across four experiments, we found no evidence that automatic “perspective-taking” effects in the 
dot-perspective task are modulated by beliefs about the animacy of the central stimulus. Our results 
also suggest that these effects may be due to the task-switching elements of the dot-perspective 
paradigm, rather than automatic directional orienting. Together, these results indicate that neither 
the perspective-taking nor the standard submentalizing interpretations of the dot-perspective task 
are fully correct.  
  
Keywords: Perspective-taking, animacy attribution, submentalizing, dot-perspective task 
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Introduction 
 
Mindreading – the ability to predict and interpret the behavior of others in terms of their 
underlying mental states – is widely believed to be a central part of human social cognition 
(Apperly, 2011; Baron-Cohen, 1997; Spaulding, 2018; Tomasello, 2014; Wellman, 2014). 
However, cognitive scientists are divided about the psychological scope of mindreading, and the 
range of cognitive phenomena that actually involve reasoning about unobservable mental states 
(Andrews, 2012; Bermudez, 2003; Heyes, 2014; Ruffman, 2014). Few would deny, of course, that 
the ability to represent mental states is required in certain complex tasks, such as making explicit 
verbal predictions about the actions of an agent with a false belief (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However,  there is much more disagreement about whether more 
subtle instances of putative mentalizing involve rapid, unconscious processing. This is because 
many of the tasks used to detect these subtle forms of mindreading also admit of lower-level, non-
mentalistic interpretations involving processes that only give the appearance of mental-state 
attribution – what Cecilia Heyes has called “submentalizing” (Heyes, 2014, 2018). If it were the 
case that many putatively mentalistic processes are in fact the product of submentalizing, this 
would force many mindreading theorists to radically rethink widespread ideas about the scope of 
mindreading in everyday social cognition. 
One paradigm that has become a particular focus of the mentalizing-submentalizing debate 
is the dot-perspective task, which was originally designed to determine whether adults 
spontaneously and unintentionally represent what others can or cannot see (Qureshi, Apperly, & 
Samson, 2010; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010; Surtees, Samson, 
& Apperly, 2016). In standard versions of the dot-perspective task, participants are shown images 
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of a room with three walls and a centrally placed human avatar standing in profile. In different 
trials, between zero and three red dots appear on the walls, while the avatar periodically changes 
its orientation. In some trials, participants must report the number of dots that they can see (i.e., 
“Self” trials), whereas in others, they must report the number of dots that the avatar can see (i.e., 
“Other” trials). The trials of interest are those where the number of dots that the avatar can see is 
inconsistent with the number of dots the participant can see, and the participant must report on 
their own perspective. On these trials, the avatar’s inconsistent perspective appears to interfere 
with the participant’s performance, leading to longer response times and increased rates of error. 
Originally, this “altercentric interference” effect was interpreted as evidence that 
participants automatically represent the visual perspective of the avatars, even on trials where this 
information is irrelevant (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010). 
However, an alternative “submentalizing” interpretation has also been offered: Participants are not 
in fact representing what the avatar can see, but are instead being spatially cued by the low-level 
directional properties of the avatar, which interfere with their performance on the task 
(Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird, & Heyes, 2014). Thus, according to the submentalizing 
interpretation, what drives the altercentric interference effect is not the visual perspective of the 
avatar but, rather, the fact that the avatar has a canonical orientation that draws our attention in a 
particular direction.  
A number of experiments have been conducted to test these competing perspective-taking 
and submentalizing hypotheses by holding fixed the directional characteristics of the avatar while 
manipulating the presence or absence of perspectival mental states. However, the results of these 
experiments have been somewhat equivocal. For example, Furlanetto and colleagues (2016) 
conducted a version of the dot-perspective task in which the avatar was shown wearing colored 
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goggles, which participants believed to be either transparent (the Seeing condition) or opaque (the 
Non-Seeing condition). Consistent with the perspective-taking hypothesis, they found evidence 
for altercentric inference in the Seeing condition trials, but not in Non-Seeing trials. However, 
Conway and colleagues (2017) failed to obtain a similar result in both exact and conceptual 
replications of this paradigm; instead, their results were broadly consistent with the submentalizing 
hypothesis. 
In what is perhaps the best-known test of the perspective-taking and submentalizing 
hypotheses, Santiesteban and colleagues (2014) conducted another version of the dot-perspective 
task in which the effects of the avatar were compared to the effects of an arrow placed in the same 
location pointing towards one of the walls. They reasoned that if it were only the low-level 
directional properties of the avatar that drove the altercentric interference effect, then the presence 
of the arrow – a directional but otherwise inanimate stimulus – should yield a comparable result. 
This is indeed what they found, suggesting that it was the directionality of the avatar that drove 
the altercentric interference effect, rather than any of the intentional mental properties that people 
may have ascribed to it (see also O’Grady, Scott-Phillips, Lavelle, and Smith, (2017) and 
Santiesteban, Kaur, Bird, and Catmur (2017) for similar results). 
However, in their original discussion of this experiment, Santiesteban and colleagues 
acknowledge that these results also lend themselves to an alternative, mentalistic interpretation – 
namely, that participants’ everyday experiences with arrows have led them to habitually attribute 
quasi-visual perspectives to them. This possibility is not particularly far-fetched: Dating back to 
Heider and Simmel’s famous intentionality attribution experiments, there is a large literature 
showing that humans both explicitly and implicitly attribute psychological properties to inanimate 
objects (Gao, Newman, & Scholl, 2009; Heider & Simmel, 1944). Arrows are particularly apt 
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targets for this kind of attribution, because they possess derived intentionality (Searle, 1983): They 
are imbued with semantic content by their authors, and are used for specific communicative 
purposes – whether that is directing traffic, indicating salient locations on a map, or simply telling 
someone to “look over there!” In effect, they serve the same basic function as more naturalistic 
gestures, such as finger-pointing, nodding one’s head in a particular direction, or even visibly 
shifting one’s eyes. In other words, both arrows and avatars may confound intentionality and 
directionality. 
Because of their mentalistic connotations, arrows are imperfect inanimate controls for the 
dot-perspective task. Santiesteban and colleagues tacitly acknowledge this confound, but they 
argue that such an interpretation would render the implicit mentalizing hypothesis untestable in 
practice: If implicit perspective-taking were so promiscuous that it could occur even with 
inanimate entities, then it is not obvious how one could ever develop an adequate way to control 
for the role of perceived animacy in the dot-perspective task. 
Thus, one of the fundamental challenges to resolving this debate about the dot-perspective 
task is to find a way to isolate the respective roles of abstract representations of perspectival agency 
and low-level directionality in a way that does not confound the two. This is the challenge we take 
on in the current study. Our primary innovation is to replace both the avatars and the arrows 
employed in previous versions of the task with a single perceptually unfamiliar object, and to then 
manipulate whether participants believe that the object is either animate or inanimate. This 
approach eliminates the possibility that participants in the inanimate condition have prior 
mentalistic associations with the stimulus, and also permits us to control for any other low-level 
perceptual differences between the animate and inanimate conditions. 
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Our approach is inspired by the use of “novel entity” paradigms in the study of infant gaze 
following (Beier & Carey, 2014; Johnson, 2003; Johnson et al., 2008; Johnson, Slaughter, & 
Carey, 1998). In these studies, 12-month-old infants will follow the implied attentional direction 
(i.e., “gaze”) of a novel object of ambiguous animacy provided that the object exhibits certain 
socially relevant behaviors, such as the capacity to respond to people in a contingent, 
communicative fashion. Once a novel object has been construed as a potential agent, infants and 
adults respond to it with a range of overt social behaviors, including following its gaze, describing 
its movements with intentionally laden vocabulary, and even helping it achieve an instrumental 
goal (Kenward & Gredebäck, 2013). However, neither gaze following nor intentional attributions 
occur if participants do not view the object’s initial behavior as sufficiently social (Beier & Carey, 
2014; Tauzin & Gergely, 2019). 
Of particular relevance to the mentalizing-submentalizing debate surrounding the dot-
perspective task, construing a novel object as an agent also influences more low-level, automatic 
processes. Terrizzi and Beier (2016) investigated the influence of agency construal on children’s 
and adults’ covert attentional responses within a gaze-cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980; Terrizzi & 
Beier, 2016). They found that participants fixated more quickly on laterally presented targets that 
appeared in locations congruent with the prior orientation of a novel object—but only when that 
object had previously behaved in a socially contingent manner indicative of its agency. In other 
words, the presence of social contingency information engages both overt and covert processes 
that underlie social interactions with others. These results are especially relevant because there is 
good reason to believe that both the gaze cueing and dot perspective tasks tap into similar 
underlying attentional processes (Bukowski, Hietanen, & Samson, 2015; Westra, 2017). Thus, the 
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employment of novel entities provides an opportunity to manipulate perceptions of animacy in a 
dot-perspective task. 
In the four experiments reported here, we implemented a novel version of the dot-
perspective task that replaced the central figure with an unfamiliar object modeled after the stimuli 
from Terrizzi and Beier (2016). To minimize the risk that participants would spontaneously imbue 
this central figure with perspectival agency, we ensured that it lacked any characteristically agentic 
features. Prior to completing the task, participants completed a familiarization task in which 
participants either (a) read a story describing the unfamiliar object as though it were an animate 
agent, or (b) were led to believe that the object was a completely inanimate entity with one side 
designated as its “front”. This enabled us to control whether the very same stimulus would be 
perceived as either an animate agent with an implied perspective, or as an inanimate object with 
directional properties. Using unfamiliar objects also made it unlikely that participants would 
spontaneously imbue the central stimulus with perspectival agency, and thus helped to control for 
the confounds posed by the use of arrows as inanimate controls (c.f., Santiesteban et al., 2014).  
As with other versions of the dot-perspective task, we were most interested in “Self” trials 
in which the “perspective” of the stimulus was inconsistent with that of the participant. In 
Experiment 1, we aimed to determine whether participants exposed to our animacy familiarization 
would subsequently display an altercentric interference effect on these trials comparable to the one 
that is usually observed in other versions of the dot-perspective task (Samson et al., 2010; Qureshi 
et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2014).  
In Experiment 2, we employed a between-subjects animacy manipulation in order to test 
whether any altercentric interference effect may be due to participants’ perception of the unfamiliar 
object as an agent or as an inanimate entity with a front. If the mentalistic interpretation of the dot-
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perspective task is correct, we predicted that only participants instructed to view the entity as an 
agent (an alien creature) should display the altercentric interference effect, because this is the only 
condition in which the central stimulus is presented as having a perspective. If, however, the 
submentalizing interpretation of the task is correct, participants instructed to view the entity as an 
inanimate object (a mineral) should also display such an effect. 
Experiment 3 was designed to overcome one limitation of Experiment 2. Specifically, in 
Experiment 2, participants saw both the animate alien and inanimate mineral, which were highly 
visually similar to one another. This might have caused participants in the Inanimate Condition to 
mistake the mineral for the alien, causing them to view the former as animate. To probe this 
possibility, Experiment 3 implemented a different familiarization phase which did not introduce 
the possibility that the entity may be an animate agent.  
Experiment 4 employed the same between-subjects animacy manipulation as Experiment 
2 with one important difference: participants were only ever asked to report the number of dots 
visible from their own perspective, as opposed to the “perspective” of the novel entity. This design 
enabled us to perform a further test of the perspective-taking hypothesis, while also allowing us to 
tease apart the predictions of the submentalizing account from an alternative non-mentalistic 
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The hypotheses, sample sizes, methods, and initial analyses were all pre-registered before data 
collection. The pre-registration and the script used for this experiment, as well as all the raw data, 
can be accessed at https://osf.io/pm3gu. 
 
Participants 
Using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) we determined that a sample size of 34 would provide 80% 
statistical power for detecting a medium-sized effect (d = .5) in the planned comparisons, assuming 
a paired (two tailed) t-test with an alpha level of .05. Due to experimenter error, we collected 37 
rather than 34 participants. Four participants were excluded because their overall accuracy was 
below the threshold of 85%. Thus, the final sample was made up of 33 participants (15 males, 18 
females, 0 undisclosed, Mage= 26.15 years, SDage= 4.96 years). For recruitment, we used the 
participant database at the University of BLINDED, where the experiment was conducted. All 
participants were naïve to the purpose of the study, reported normal or corrected to normal vision, 
and signed informed consent prior to the experiment. The experiment was conducted in accordance 
with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the BLINDED ethics committee at the 
University of BLINDED. Each participant received £6 for participating. 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The experiment was displayed on a 13-inch computer screen (resolution: 2560 × 1600 pixels, 
refresh rate: 60 Hz). The program for the experiment was written in Python (Peirce, 2007), with a 
frame-rate of 17 frames per second. 
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As in Samson et al. (2010), the stimuli consisted of a picture showing a lateral view into a 
room with the left, back, and right walls visible; on test trials, zero, one, or two red dots were 
displayed either one or two walls. During the familiarization phase, participants saw images of a 
novel entity (based on the novel entity in Terrizzi & Beier [2016]) positioned in the center of the 




After giving their informed written consent and reading the instructions, participants underwent a 
familiarization phase. During this phase, they clicked through a succession of slides in which the 
novel entity introduced itself as a member of an alien species named “Dax”, and described the life 
habits of this species. Participants then performed a brief task in which they differentiated between 
the novel entity and a differently colored version of the novel entity, which was described as a 
'mineral’ (this aspect of the familiarization was included in anticipation of the animacy 
manipulation in Experiment 2). Familiarizations can be viewed at https://osf.io/9ghvs/. 
During the test trials (See Figure 1) a fixation cross was displayed for 500 ms, followed by 
a 750ms presentation of either the word “YOU” or the word “DAX”, which specified whether the 
participant had to judge their own perspective or the perspective of the novel entity (i.e. a Self trial 
or an Other trial). Next, a digit (0-3) appeared for 750 ms, which specified a target number of dots 
for the participant to verify. The image of the room then appeared with the dots on the walls and 
the novel entity avatar in the center. The dots remained on the screen until a response was given 
or 2,000ms elapsed, whereupon the next trial would begin.  
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Participants then completed 4 blocks, each consisting of 80 trials. Of these 80 trials, 8 were 
fillers (i.e. the correct answer is “0”). Of the 72 test trials, the correct answer to 36 of them was 
“yes” and the correct answer to 36 of them was “no”. Of the 36 test trials analyzed from each 
block, 18 were Self-perspective trials and 18 were Other-perspective trials. As in previous studies 
using this paradigm, we will only analyze trials for which the correct answer is “yes” (Samson et 
al, 2010; Michael et al., 2018). This is because the non-matching trials have to be constructed in 
an unbalanced manner: On mismatching (“no” response) consistent trials, the digit specifies a 
number of discs that did not correspond to anyone’s perspective, making these trials particularly 




Figure 1. Schematic depiction of familiarization and test phase procedures from Experiment 1. On 
matching trials ('yes' response) in the test phase, the digit specifying the target number 
corresponded to the number of dots on the walls. On mismatching trials ('no' response) in the test 
phase, the digit specified a number that was either one higher or one lower than the number of dots 
on the walls. On Inconsistent trials, the number of dots on the wall matched for one perspective, 
but not for the other. On Consistent trials, the number of dots matched both perspectives.  





Results and Discussion 
 
To control for speed-accuracy tradeoffs, reaction time (RT) for correct responses and hit rates (HR) 
were merged into inverse efficiency scores (IES), a combined measure which homogenizes 
different patterns of speed-accuracy trade-offs within a group (IES=RT/HR; Townsend & Ashby, 
1978). Since the calculation of IES entails that RTs are quasi-exponentially multiplied as the HR 
decreases, Bruyer & Brysbaert (2011) have recommend not using the IES unless the mean HR 
within a group is above 90%, and HRs are negatively correlated with RTs. In our sample, the mean 
HR was above 90% in each experiment, and HRs were negatively correlated with RTs. A negative 
correlation between HR and RT implies a lack of speed-accuracy tradeoffs, which indicates that it 
was appropriate to use IES for the primary analysis. This negative correlation between HR and RT 
was present in each experiment (Experiment 1: r = -.20, Experiment 2: r = -.18, Experiment 3: r = 
-.34, Experiment 4: r = -.31). We also include a table of the RTs and HRs in each condition for all 
three experiments (Table 1). In calculating mean reaction times (RTs), response omissions due to 
the timeout procedure (1.16% of the data) and erroneous responses (3.06% of the data) were 
eliminated, as were trials where the correct response was “no” (50%). We also removed trials with 
responses that were more than 2.5 SDs greater or less than the mean for each participant for each 
condition (2.57% of the data). 
We performed a two-way ANOVA for IES (See Figure 2). The results revealed a significant main 
effect of consistency, with performance being better in the consistent condition (M= 759.75, SD= 
162.93) than in the inconsistent condition (M= 812.17, SD= 168.40), (F(1,32) = 48.01, p < .001, 
ηG2 
 
 = 0.025). There was no main effect of perspective – i.e. performance did not differ 
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significantly between the self (M= 775.26, SD= 166.45) and the other (M= 796.65, SD= 168.41) 
(F(2,18) = 2.68, p = .111, ηG2 = 0.004). We also observed an interaction between perspective and 
consistency (F(2,18) = 28.36, p < .001, ηG2  
 
 = 0.010). 
Planned contrast analyses revealed that the difference in performance between consistent 
and inconsistent trials was significant when the task was to report what was in front of the novel 
entity, (t (32) = 8.80, p < .001, d = 0.50); this provides evidence of egocentric interference. The 
difference in performance between consistent and inconsistent trials was marginally significant 
when the task was to report the content of their own perspective (t (32) = 2.01, p = .052, d = 0.18). 
These results indicate that the main effect of consistency was driven largely by egocentric 
interference, although the pattern of responses suggests a role for altercentric interference as well. 
We followed up on this pattern in Experiment 2. 




Figure 2: Experiment 1 Results for IES. Error bars indicate standard error. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. Overview of (A) IESs, (B) RTs and (C) HRs and in each condition 







In Experiment 1 we observed participant responses suggestive of an altercentric interference 
effect. Experiment 2 sought to replicate this finding and also investigate whether this pattern was 
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driven primarily by the fact that the novel entity was presented as an animate agent, or by its lower-
level directional properties. To this end, we employed a between-subjects design to compare 
responses to the novel entity across an Animate and Inanimate condition. Both conditions began 
with the same familiarization sequence, also used in Experiment 1. This familiarization introduced 
a novel alien creature and a novel mineral formation that was visually identical to the alien, save 
for a difference in coloring. In the Animate Condition, the entity featured in the test trials was the 
alien/agent; thus, this condition was an internal replication of Experiment 1. In the Inanimate 
Condition, the entity featured in the test trials was the mineral/inanimate object (which had been 
given an arbitrarily designated “front” during the familiarization). Thus, the only major difference 
between the two conditions was whether participants believed that the novel entity before them 
during test trials was animate or inanimate. Both familiarizations can be viewed at 
https://osf.io/9ghvs/. 
We predicted that, if the effect of consistency we observed in Experiment 1 was driven by 
representations of animacy, we would observe it in the Animate Condition only, or else that we 
would observe a larger effect of consistency in the Animate condition. If, however, the effects in 
Experiment 1 were in fact driven by the directionality of the novel entity, then we should instead 
find similarly sized effects of consistency in the Animate and Inanimate Conditions. The 
hypotheses, sample sizes, methods, and initial analyses were all pre-registered before data 
collection. The pre-registration and the script used for this experiment, as well as all the raw data, 




Running Head: BEYOND AVATARS AND ARROWS     18 
To facilitate comparison with the results of Experiment 1, we aimed to include the same number 
of participants in each of the two groups in Experiment 2 as we had tested in Experiment 1. We 
therefore determined that the appropriate sample would be 74 participants (37 in each group). We 
collected data from 108 participants and 30 were excluded because their overall accuracy was 
below the threshold of 85%.1 Thus, the final sample was made up of 78 participants (24 males, 54 
females, 0 undisclosed, Mage= 23.46 years, SDage= 5.58 years). For recruitment, we used the 
participant database at the University of BLINDED), where the experiment was conducted. All 
participants were naïve to the purpose of the study, reported normal or corrected to normal vision, 
and signed informed consent prior to the experiment. The experiment was conducted in accordance 
with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by BLINDED ethics committee. Each 
participant received gift vouchers totalling equivalent to 6 Euros for participating. 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
 
The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1, with one exception: Test trials could 
feature either a blue or green version of the novel entity. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 except that one group of participants (Inanimate 
Condition) were informed that the entity in the virtual room was a mineral, and a separate group 
was informed that it was an animate agent (Animate Condition), as in Experiment 1. Within each 
 
1 The relatively high exclusion rate for this Experiment (and the next one) may have been due to the fact that for this 
study, participants were tested in groups, whereas in Experiment 1 they were tested one at a time. See the General 
Discussion for more on this potential limitation of the current study. 
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group, half of the participants viewed a blue version of the novel entity, whereas the other half of 
the participants viewed a green version. Participants in the Animate Condition were asked to 
respond based on the number of dots the novel entity could “see”, whereas participants in the 
Inanimate Condition were asked to respond based on the number of dots that were “in front of” 
the novel entity. Before “Other” trials, participants in the Inanimate condition saw the word 
“MINERAL” instead of the word “DAX.” 
 
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, the mean HR in our sample was above 90% in all four conditions, indicating 
that it was appropriate to perform the analyses using IES. In calculating mean reaction times (RTs), 
response omissions due to the timeout procedure (2.54% of the data) and erroneous responses 
(5.21% of the data) were eliminated from the data set, as were trials where the correct response 
was “no” (50%). We also removed trials with responses that were more than 2.5 SDs greater or 
less than the mean for each participant for each condition (2.44% of the data). 
We conducted a three-way ANOVA, with Animacy, Perspective and Consistency as Factors (See 
Figure 3). The results revealed a main effect of Consistency (F(1,76) = 109.35, p < .001, ηG2  
 
 = 
.056), with performance on consistent trials (M = 799.9, SD = 182.5) being superior to performance 
on inconsistent trials (M = 879, SD = 190.8). There was also a main effect of Perspective (F(1,76) 
= 33.65, p < .001, ηG2  
 
 = .019), with performance on self trials (M = 807.9, SD = 184.4) being 
superior to performance on other trials (M = 860, SD = 196.1). There was no main effect of 
Animacy, (F(1,76) = 0.04, p = .85, ηG2  
 
 < .01), with performance not differing significantly 
between inanimate trials (M = 837.8, SD = 200.1) and animate trials (M = 830.2, SD = 183.7). We 
observed no significant interaction between Animacy and Perspective (F(1,76) = 0.04, p = .83, ηG2  
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< .001), and no significant interaction between Animacy and Consistency (F(1,76) = 0.26, p = .61, 
ηG2  
 
 < .001), while we did observe a significant interaction between Perspective and Consistency 
(F(1,76) = 31.42, p < .001, ηG2    = .01).  
We also conducted a Bayesian analysis (using default priors and function stan_glmer() from the 
rstanarm package, see Goodrich et al., 2020) to quantify the support for the null effect of the 
interaction between Animacy and Consistency. Here we found decisive evidence in support of the 
model in which there was no interaction, BF01 = 90.9. This means that there is roughly 91 times 
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Figure 3. Experiment 2 Results for IES for (A) Self perspective trials and for (B) Other perspective 




As in Experiment 1, we observed a main effect of consistency. In Experiment 2, however, 
this effect was significant both when the task was to report what was in front of the novel entity 
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(egocentric interference) and when the task was to report the content of one’s own perspective 
(altercentric interference).  
The absence of any interaction between Animacy and Consistency in Experiment 2 is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the interference effect observed in Experiment 1 was due to the 
novel entity’s low-level directionality cues rather than its animacy. However, one possible 
confound of Experiment 2’s design is that participants in both conditions underwent the same 
familiarization phase, which introduced both the animate and inanimate entities. Perhaps the 
highly visual similarity of the alien creature and mineral object created an “animacy carry-over” 





In order to minimize any “animacy carry-over” effect from the familiarization phase to the test 
phase, Experiment 3 implemented a third version of the novel entity dot-perspective task. In this 
version, participants never learned that the inanimate entity was visually similar to any animate 
agent. That is, the familiarization sequence only introduced the novel entity as a mineral formation. 
Participants did not learn about, or interact with, the animate alien that had been depicted in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
We predicted that, if the null effect for Animacy observed in Experiment 2 was due to 
“animacy carry-over” from the alien to the mineral, we should not find a main effect of 
Consistency in Experiment 3. Such a finding would provide evidence that participants viewing the 
alien agent in Experiments 1 and 2 may yet have experienced interference that arose from taking 
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its visual perspective. However, if there was no “animacy carry-over” effect in Experiment 2, then 
we should again observe an effect of Consistency in Experiment 3. This finding would provide 
evidence that participants experience interference on the dot-probe task arising from purely low-
level directional cues. The hypotheses, sample sizes, methods, and initial analyses were all pre-
registered before data collection. The pre-registration and the script used for this experiment, as 




To facilitate comparison with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, we aimed for a sample size of 37 
participants. We collected data from 63 participants, 24 of whom were excluded because their 
overall accuracy was below the threshold of 85%. Thus, the final sample was made up of 39 
participants (20 males, 19 females, 0 undisclosed, Mage= 20.77 years, SDage= 3.72 years). For 
recruitment, we used the participant database at the University of BLINDED), where the 
experiment was conducted. All participants were naïve to the purpose of the study, reported normal 
or corrected to normal vision, and signed informed consent prior to the experiment. The 
experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by 
BLINDED ethics committee. Each participant received gift vouchers totalling equivalent to 6 
Euros for participating. 
 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
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The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the procedure for the Inanimate Condition in Experiment 2, except 
that participants underwent a different familiarization phase that did not feature any entities 
described as animate, nor any entities with which participants directly interacted. Instead, 
participants clicked through a series of slides describing in some detail the physical properties of 
the unfamiliar entity, which was introduced as a mineral. This sequence used the same visual 
images as the full familiarization sequence from Experiments 1 and 2 (with the exception of one 
slide in which we deleted a “thought bubble,” which would have otherwise functioned as a 
symbolic cue to animacy). Thus, the familiarization in Experiment 3 was the same length as, and 
closely visually matched to, the familiarization from Experiments 1 and 2. 
  
Results and Discussion 
 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the mean HR in our sample was above 90% in all three conditions, 
indicating that it was appropriate to use IES for the analysis. In calculating mean reaction times 
(RTs), response omissions due to the timeout procedure (1.64% of the data) and erroneous 
responses (4.62% of the data) were eliminated from the data set, as were trials where the correct 
response was “no” (50%). We also removed trials with responses that were more than 2.5 SDs 
greater or less than the mean for each participant for each condition (2.37% of the data). 
We performed a two-way ANOVA for IES (See Figure 4). The results revealed a 
significant main effect of Consistency, with performance being better in the Consistent condition 
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(M= 741.40, SD= 126.76) than in the Inconsistent condition (M= 819.29, SD= 144.10), (F(1,38) = 
41.81, p < .001, ηG2  
 
 = 0.08). There was also a main effect of Perspective – i.e. performance was 
better in the Self condition (M = 755.36, SD = 120.61) than in the Other condition (M= 805.32, 
SD= 155.22) (F(1,38) = 14.09, p < .001, ηG2  
 
= 0.03). We also observed an interaction between 
perspective and consistency (F(1,38) = 16.82, p < .001, ηG2  
 
 = 0.02). 
Planned contrast analyses revealed that the difference in performance between Consistent 
and Inconsistent trials was highly significant on Other trials, i.e. when the task was to report what 
was in front of the novel entity, (t (32) = 7.0, p < .001, d = 0.74); this provides evidence of 
egocentric interference. The difference in performance between consistent and inconsistent trials 
was also significant when the task was to report the content of their own perspective (t (38) = 3.41, 
p < .001, d = 0.37); this indicates evidence of altercentric interference.  
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Figure 4: Experiment 3 Results for IES. Error bars indicate standard error. 
 
 
In Experiment 3, we removed all discussion of animacy from the familiarization phase in 
order to minimize the risk of any possible animacy carry-over effect. Nevertheless, we again 
observed a main effect of consistency (both altercentric and egocentric interference). This provides 
further support for the hypothesis that the effects observed in Experiments 1 and 2 were due to 
low-level directional cues instantiated by the central object.  
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Experiment 4 
 
Experiment 4 was designed to probe the possibility that the Consistency effect observed in 
the first three experiments may have been due to a design artefact. One notable feature of the dot-
perspective task is that participants must constantly alternate between attending to and ignoring 
the directional orientation of the central figure, because they are instructed either to take its 
perspective or attend to its front. This raises the possibility that the interference effects on 
inconsistent Self trials were caused by difficulties with inhibiting a prepotent response to the 
direction of the stimulus, which would have been highly salient during Other trials (Conway et al. 
2017, p. 56, Samson et al., 2010, p. 1259; Santiesteban et al., 2014, p. 934; Schurz et al., 2015, p. 
387). This “task-switching hypothesis” amounts to a third possible explanation of the altercentric 
interference effect that we detected in earlier experiments: unlike the perspective-taking 
hypothesis, it is not specifically triggered by the perceived perspectival characteristics of the 
central stimulus; unlike the standard submentalizing account, the effect is not simply due to the 
fact that the stimulus has directional features to which participants display an automatic orienting 
response (Santiesteban et al. 2014, 2017). Rather, the task-switching hypothesis suggests that it is 
the challenge of alternating between attending to and ignoring the directionality of the central 
figure that drives altercentric interference. In order to test this possibility, the current study 
employed a “Self-Only” design, in which participants only ever completed trials in which they had 
to make judgments about their own perspective, and were never asked to make judgments about 
the perspective/directionality of the novel entity (see Samson et al. 2010 and Santiesteban et al. 
2014). This design eliminates any possibility of task-switching.  
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Another implication of the task-switching hypothesis is that it may have interfered with 
our animacy manipulation in Experiment 2. If task-switching is able to generate an altercentric 
interference effect on its own, this leaves open the possibility that an effect of animacy on 
altercentric interference might manifest in a task design that controls for this confound. That is, 
altercentric interference due the task-switching in our earlier inanimate conditions might have 
prevented us from detecting any effects of our animacy manipulation. Therefore, Experiment 4 
also employed the same familiarization and between-subjects animacy manipulation as was used 
in Experiment 2. This, combined with the aforementioned Self-only design, will enable us to test 
our initial study question about the respective roles of animacy and directionality in the dot-
perspective task, while at the same time controlling for the possibility of a task-switching 
confound. If the perspective-taking hypothesis is correct, we should expect to observe an 
interaction between Consistency and Animacy, with weaker performance in Inconsistent trials in 
the Animate condition only. If the submentalizing hypothesis is correct, we should observe a main 
effect of Consistency, but no effect of Animacy. If however previously observed effects of 
Consistency were merely due to task-switching between Self and Other trials, then all Consistency 
effects should disappear in the current Self-Only design.  
One significant difference between the self-only and self-other designs is that it renders the 
animacy manipulation much more subtle. During Other trials in our previous experiments, 
participants were shown a screen that read either “Dax” or “Mineral,” which served as a repeated 
reminder of our Animacy manipulation. In the current Self-only design, however, this repeated 
reminder was absent, which opened up the possibility that participants might forget whether they 
are looking at an alien or a mineral (which are distinguished only by their color). To guard against 
this possibility, the current study employed an additional post-study manipulation check to ensure 
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that participants in each condition actually represented the novel entity as either animate or 
inanimate. 
The hypotheses, sample sizes, methods, and initial analyses were all pre-registered before 
data collection. The pre-registration and the script used for this experiment, as well as all the raw 
data, can be accessed at: https://osf.io/nwbrz. 
 
Participants 
Using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) we determined that a sample size of 54 (27 per 
condition) would provide 95% statistical power for detecting an effect of d= .8 in the planned 
comparisons. For better comparison with Experiment 2, we decided to aim for a total of 72 
participants. We collected data from 72 participants, 3 of whom were excluded because their 
overall accuracy was below the threshold of 85%, and 13 of whom were excluded because they 
failed the manipulation check at the end. The COVID-19 pandemic made it unfeasible to replace 
these participants. Thus, the final sample was made up of 56 participants, 31 in the Animate 
condition and 25 in the Inanimate condition (33 males, 23 females, 0 undisclosed, Mage= 26.5 
years, SDage= 4.1 years).2 For recruitment, we used the participant database at the University of 
BLINDED), where the experiment was conducted. All participants were naïve to the purpose of 
the study, reported normal or corrected to normal vision, and signed informed consent prior to the 
experiment. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and 
was approved by BLINDED ethics committee. Each participant received gift vouchers totaling 
equivalent to 6 Euros for participating. 
 
2 Supplemental analyses conducted without these exclusions (N=69) did not affect any of the primary results of this 
study. 
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Apparatus and Stimuli 
 
The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Procedure 
Participants viewed the same familiarization as in Experiment 1 and 2. As in Experiment 
2, one group of participants was informed that the entity in the virtual room was a mineral 
(Inanimate Condition), and a separate group was informed that it was an animate agent (Animate 
Condition). Within each group, half of the participants viewed a blue version of the novel entity, 
whereas the other half of the participants viewed a green version. Unlike in Experiment 2, 
participants in both conditions only completed Self trials in which they were asked to judge how 
many dots they could see from their own perspective, and never had to make any judgments about 
the “perspective” of the entity. After they completed the test trials, participants were redirected to 
an online post-study questionnaire containing a manipulation check asking participants to report 
whether the entity that they saw in the middle of the screen was an alien or a mineral; they could 
also select a third option indicating if they did not remember. Participants were also asked to 
complete two open-ended response questions asking them to describe what they saw on the screen.  
  
Results and Discussion 
 
Running Head: BEYOND AVATARS AND ARROWS     31 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the mean HR in our sample was above 90% in all three 
conditions, indicating that it was appropriate to use IES for the analysis. In calculating mean 
reaction times (RTs), response omissions due to the timeout procedure and erroneous responses 
(3.09% of the data) were eliminated from the data set, as were trials where the correct response 
was “no” (50%). We also removed trials with responses that were more than 2.5 SDs greater or 
less than the mean for each participant for each condition (0.38% of the data). 
We performed a two-way ANOVA for IES (See Figure 5). The results revealed no 
significant main effect of Consistency, (F(1,54) = 0.34, p = .56, ηG2   < 0.01). There was a main 
effect of Animacy – i.e. performance was better in the Animate condition than in the Inanimate 
condition (F(1,54) = 14.3, p < .001, ηG2  
 
= 0.2). We did not observe a significant interaction 
between Animacy and Consistency (F(1,54) = 0.32, p = .58, ηG2  
 
 < 0.01).3 
We also conducted a Bayesian analysis (again using default priors and function 
stan_glmer() from the rstanarm package) to quantify the support for the null effects of Consistency 
and the interaction between Animacy and Consistency. Here we found decisive evidence in 
support of the model in which there was no main effect of consistency, BF01 = 66.7, and no 
interaction, BF01 = 66.7. This means that there is roughly 67 times more evidence for the absence of 




3 Although we also collected responses to additional two open-ended post-study survey questions, the analysis of 
these data was rendered moot by the fact that we did not discover any altercentric interference effects. As such, we 
elected not to analyze these responses. We do include them on the OSF project page:  https://osf.io/9ghvs/files/. 
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Figure 5: Experiment 4 Results for IES. Error bars indicate standard error. 
 
Collectively, these results suggest that previous effects of Consistency were due to task-
switching, rather than submentalizing or perspective-taking. Contrary to the submentalizing 
hypothesis, which explained previous results in terms of the directionality of the stimulus, we 
observed no effects of Consistency in the current study. Contrary to the perspective-taking 
hypothesis, we did not observe any interactions between Animacy and Consistency. Surprisingly, 
we did observe a main effect of Animacy, albeit in the opposite direction as the one predicted by 
the perspective-taking hypothesis. Far from selectively interfering with performance, participants 
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in the Animate condition actually exhibited superior performance. This may have been because 
construing the stimulus as animate made participants pay more attention to the task (New, 









We investigated whether prior findings of altercentric interference in a dot-perspective task 
are more likely to have arisen from mentalistic or submentalizing cognitive processes. Unlike 
previous versions of the dot-perspective task that have relied upon highly familiar, intentionally 
laden inanimate controls to test these two competing accounts (e.g. Santiesteban et al., 2014), the 
central figure used in our dot-perspective task was a completely novel entity lacking agentic 
features. This enabled us to effectively manipulate whether participants viewed the central figure 
as an animate, perspectival agent, or as an inanimate object with minimal directionality. In this 
way, we were able to more precisely test whether the altercentric interference effects traditionally 
found in the dot-perspective task are due to representations of perspectival agency (as predicted 
by the mentalizing hypothesis), or due to low-level directional properties of the stimulus (as 
predicted by the submentalizing hypothesis). 
In Experiments 1-3, we observed altercentric interference in this new version of the dot-
perspective task. Experiment 1 provided an initial validation of our novel stimuli. In Experiment 
2, we manipulated whether participants were either informed that the central entity was animate 
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(an alien) or that it was inanimate (a mineral formation). In this context, the mentalizing hypothesis 
predicts that only participants instructed to view the entity as an agent should display the 
altercentric interference effect, because this is the only condition in which the central stimulus is 
assumed to have a visual perspective. In contrast, the submentalizing hypothesis predicts that 
participants instructed to view the entity as an inanimate object should also display such an effect. 
We repeatedly found main effects of Consistency, but no main effects of Animacy or interactions 
between Consistency and Animacy, which was most consistent with the submentalizing 
hypothesis. This interpretation was further supported by the results of Experiment 3, which also 
found an effect of Consistency when participants viewed the central entity as an inanimate object. 
Our final experiment, however, led us to view these earlier experiments in a different light. 
Experiment 4 was designed to probe the possibility that the Consistency effect observed in the first 
three experiments might have been due to the demands of task-switching across Self and Other 
trials. During Other trials, the directionality of the central figure is task-relevant and therefore 
highly salient. During Self trials, these directional features are not task-relevant. However, due to 
the need to constantly alternate between Self and Other trials, the directional properties of the 
central figure very likely retain their salience for the participants throughout the experiment. 
Altercentric interference effects on Self trials might therefore stem from  difficulties with 
inhibiting a prepotent response to directional features made salient by the task demands of Other 
trials. In other words, altercentric interference effects may result from task-switching, rather than 
any “automatic” or “spontaneous” tendency to engage in perspective-taking or directional 
orienting. The results of Experiment 4, in which we only included “Self” trials and observed no 
effect of Consistency, support this interpretation. 
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Notably, other implementations of the dot-perspective paradigm have discovered 
altercentric interference effects in Self-only designs. Samson et al. (2010) employed a Self-Only 
design using both a human avatar and a rectangle as an inanimate control, and found a significant 
interaction between Consistency and their Animacy variable, which they interpreted as supporting 
the perspective-taking hypothesis. As Sanitesteban et al. (2014) pointed out, however, the 
rectangle was not a well-matched inanimate control, because it lacked strong directional 
characteristics. They implemented a Self-Only design that compared a human avatar to an arrow, 
and found a Consistency effect but no evidence of an interaction between Consistency and 
Animacy, which they interpreted as supporting the submentalizing hypothesis. In their Self-only 
version of Furlanetto and colleagues’ “goggles test” dot-perspective-task, which used human 
avatars, Conway et al. (2017) were also able to obtain an effect of Consistency; again, this was 
interpreted as supporting the submentalizing hypothesis. All considered, a pattern emerges: human 
avatars and arrows each appear to reliably generate altercentric interference effects even in Self-
only designs, while the novel entity avatar used in the current experiments only generated these 
effects in a Self-Other design. On the one hand, this tells us that task-switching is sufficient to 
generate altercentric interference effects even with very novel stimuli with minimal directional 
characteristics, regardless of whether these stimuli as construed as perspectival agents; on the other 
hand, more familiar stimuli like arrows and human avatars seem to be sufficient to generate these 
effects as well, independently of any task-switching effects.  
These conclusions have challenging implications for the mentalizing/submentalizing 
debate. As noted in the introduction, earlier attempts to tease apart these hypotheses using arrows 
as inanimate controls were unsatisfactory, because arrows still confound directionality with 
animacy because of the arrows’ derived intentionality (Searle, 1963). In the current studies, we 
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eliminated this confound by using a novel entity as an avatar, and manipulated the perceived 
animacy of the stimulus while leaving its directionality fixed. When deployed in a Self-Other 
design, this stimulus generated a pattern of results that seemed to support the submentalizing 
hypothesis. But once we eliminated the task-switching confound and the directionality of the novel 
entity was no longer task-relevant, this pattern of results disappeared. This suggests that, contrary 
to the submentalizing hypothesis, mere directionality – i.e. having a “front” – is not by itself 
enough to explain the full pattern of results that we see in various versions of the dot-perspective 
task. Additionally, the fact that our animacy manipulation also failed to induce any altercentric 
interference effects independent of task-switching suggests that mere beliefs about the animacy of 
a stimulus are also not enough to produce this effect, contrary to the mentalizing hypothesis. In 
short, the present results support neither the mentalizing hypothesis nor the submentalizing 
hypothesis, at least as it has been typically understood in this task. 
Our results  could, however, be interpreted as supporting a more generic version of the 
submentalizing hypothesis that simply denied any particular role for domain-specific perspective-
taking in the dot-perspective task (e.g. Heyes, 2014). Since the proposed task-switching account 
invokes only domain-general processes, it could perhaps be regarded as a form of submentalizing 
in this looser sense. However, it remains incompatible with the standard submentalizing 
explanation of the dot-perspective task outlined in Santiesteban et al. (2014) and Santiestaban et 
al. (2014), which focuses on automatic directional orienting. One implication of this interpretation 
is that there may be many different forms of submentalizing. Researchers aiming to test whether a 
given task involves mentalizing or submentizing should therefore take care to specify which 
submentalizing process they think might be at work. 
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Speculatively, the conditions under which altercentric interference effects do emerge all 
seem to share a common feature: something about the directionality of the stimulus made it 
relevant or salient to the participant, either because it was a person, a highly familiar symbol, or 
because they had recently attended to it in the context of another task. This observation recalls a 
distinction between perspective-selection and perspective-calculation introduced by Qureshi et al. 
(2010) and discussed in Westra (2017). Based on evidence from a version of the dot-perspective 
task that used a dual-task interference manipulation, Qureshi et al. proposed that the “perspective-
taking” process could be broken down into a perspective-selection process that recruits top-down 
attentional control to select a particular agent for a subsequent, automatic perspective-calculation 
process (i.e. determining what falls within that agent’s line of sight). Building on this idea, Westra 
(2017) argued that the perspective-selection component of this process is likely to be supported by 
goal-sensitive, unencapsulated orienting systems – specifically, the ventral attention network, 
which detects salient or task-relevant stimuli (Corbetta, Patel, & Schulman, 2008). If this 
breakdown of the process underlying performance in the dot-perspective task is correct, it implies 
that the systems controlling the inputs to the directionality-sensitive “perspective”-calculation 
process are entirely domain-general, and will respond to whatever stimuli happen to be 
behaviorally relevant. Some highly familiar stimuli, like human figures and arrows, might be 
treated as relevant by default, while other less familiar stimuli (like our novel entity) might only 
engage these saliency systems in the contexts of certain behavioral tasks. 
This picture lends itself to a hybrid model of visual perspective-taking that makes room for 
both domain-general and domain-specific processes (Michael & D’Ausilio, 2015). According to 
this hybrid approach, the discovery that domain-general processes are involved in visual 
perspective-taking need not preclude the possibility that domain-specific social representations are 
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also involved. Instead, it might be that domain-specific perspective-taking processes are 
implemented in part by domain-general spatial cueing mechanisms that are also triggered by non-
social stimuli. In other words, although visual perspective-taking and spatial cueing might involve 
overlapping sets of processes and may manifest similar behavioral profiles, they might also involve 
non-overlapping sets of processes, which might be distinguished through precisely targeted 
experimental designs (e.g. Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Marotta et al. 2012). Identifying which 
domain-general processes are involved in social perception could thus play a positive, structuring 
role in the way that domain-specific perspective-taking processes are modeled.  
The current set of studies was limited in a few ways. One limitation of Experiments 1-3 
was that they did not employ any manipulation checks to ensure that participants really construed 
the novel entity as animate or inanimate. Given this limitation, it could be argued that we cannot 
be certain whether our animacy manipulation was truly successful: participants might have 
confused the mineral with the alien, or forgotten which was which. However, the nature of the 
Other trials in Experiments 1-3 ensured that participants were repeatedly reminded that the novel 
entity was either an alien or a mineral, making this possibility unlikely. Experiment 4 lacked these 
repeated reminders, and so we did include a manipulation check in that study, which led to the 
exclusion of a number of participants who could not be replaced due to public health restrictions 
on data collection. Even with these exclusions, we were able to detect a significant effect of 
Animacy. 
A further limitation of the current set of studies concerns the high number of excluded 
participants in Experiments 2 and 3 because they did not meet our minimum performance 
threshold. This was likely due to the fact that participants in these two studies were tested in groups 
rather than individually. The presence of other people in the testing environment may have caused 
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some participants to become distracted, which may have affected their performance and resulted 
in their exclusion. This suggests that a future best practice for this paradigm may be to avoid testing 
participants in groups.  
 Overall, we found compelling evidence that a completely novel entity can trigger an 
altercentric interference effect in a dot-perspective task, and no evidence that beliefs about the 
animacy of this entity modulate this effect, contrary to the mentalizing hypothesis. However, we 
also found evidence that this effect was not due solely to the directional properties of the stimulus, 
which is inconsistent with standard versions of the submentalizing hypothesis. We interpret this 
set of results as showing that the mechanisms underlying the altercentric interference effect are 
influenced by saliency systems that are sensitive to the perceived relevance of the directional 
stimulus, either in the context of the task itself (as with our novel entity), or because of their 
familiarity as directional cues (as we see in previous studies employing humans and arrows). This 
suggests that whatever causes the altercentric interference effect, it is likely to be gated by domain-
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